Τ	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES		
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3	STEPHEN DOMINICK McFADDEN,	:	
4	Petitioner	: No. 14-378	
5	V.	:	
6	UNITED STATES.	:	
7		X	
8	Washington, D.C.		
9	Tuesday, April 21, 2015		
10			
11	The above-entitled matter ca	ame on for oral	
12	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States		
13	at 10:13 a.m.		
14	APPEARANCES:		
15	KEVIN K. RUSSELL, ESQ., Bethesda, Md.; on behalf of		
16	Petitioner.		
17	SARAH E. HARRINGTON, ESQ., Assista	nt to the Solicitor	
18	General, Department of Justice,	Washington, D.C.; on	
19	behalf of Respondent.		
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- 1 PROCEEDINGS
 2 (10:12 a.m.)
- 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear
- 4 argument this morning in Case 14-378, McFadden v.
- 5 United States.
- 6 Mr. Russell.
- 7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN K. RUSSELL
- 8 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
- 9 MR. RUSSELL: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
- 10 please the Court:
- 11 The briefing in this Court has narrowed
- 12 considerably the disagreement among the parties. We now
- 13 all agree that the Fourth Circuit misconstrued the mens
- 14 rea element for a -- a criminal offense under the
- 15 Controlled Substance Analogue Act, and we further agree
- 16 that the jury instructions actually given in this case
- 17 were erroneous.
- 18 Instead, me and the government now agree
- 19 that to prove an offense, the government must show that
- 20 the defendant knowingly distributed an analogue. And we
- 21 further agree that the government may do that by showing
- 22 that the defendant knew that the substance in question
- 23 had the characteristics that made it an analogue under
- 24 the statute.
- 25 Where we may disagree is over the

- 1 government's alternative theory that it can instead show
- 2 that the defendant knew that the substance was illegal
- 3 or regulated. If all the government means by that is
- 4 illegal or regulated under the statute of conviction,
- 5 the Controlled Substances Act itself, we would agree,
- 6 but the government would simply lose because, as it's
- 7 acknowledged, the evidence in this case tended to show
- 8 that my client did not believe that his conduct violated
- 9 the CSA itself.
- 10 JUSTICE KAGAN: But just to make sure I
- 11 understand all that you're agreeing on, you do agree
- 12 that if the defendant knew that the substance was
- 13 illegal under the Controlled Substances Act or the
- 14 Analogue Act, even though the defendant didn't know the
- 15 chemical structure or the particular effects -- say that
- 16 the dealer had handed him a box and said this is our new
- 17 analogue which is illegal under this -- under the
- 18 Analogue Act, you -- you agree that that is sufficient
- 19 for a conviction.
- 20 MR. RUSSELL: We do agree with that. And I
- 21 think that is simply a special application of the
- 22 general rule that the defendant has to know the facts
- 23 that make his conduct unlawful because he knows in that
- 24 circumstance the only fact he needs to know in order to
- 25 know that what he's doing is illegal.

- 1 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And that -- that sounds
- 2 sensible to me. What about the expert testimony from
- 3 chemists? Is that still put on in the trial? Does the
- 4 government still have to show -- put on an expert to
- 5 say, well, this is chemically modified, but it's
- 6 substantially similar and the jury sits there knowing
- 7 that it doesn't have to listen to this? I mean, how
- 8 does that work?
- 9 MR. RUSSELL: No. They do have to show that
- 10 because the government still has to prove that it is, in
- 11 fact, an analogue. So they have to both show that the
- 12 defendant --
- 13 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, but does a jury have
- 14 to understand the chemical testimony?
- 15 MR. RUSSELL: They've -- they've got to make
- 16 the determination that it is, in fact, chemically
- 17 substantially similar. I acknowledge that that's a lot
- 18 to ask of a jury. It's a lot to ask of a -- of a
- 19 defendant to understand that.
- 20 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But it is the
- 21 government's burden to show both the composition in
- 22 relation to the controlled substance, and the -- the
- 23 effect of the drug. Those -- those the government must
- 24 prove. But what we have out of the way is that the
- 25 defendant now doesn't have to know -- you agree the

- 1 defendant doesn't have to understand the chemical
- 2 structure?
- 3 MR. RUSSELL: He doesn't have to understand
- 4 the chemical structure if the government can prove that
- 5 the defendant knew that the substance was illegal under
- 6 the Controlled Substances Act itself.
- 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, the government
- 8 has given up a lot getting to this point and I think
- 9 you've just given up a lot.
- 10 I would have thought your -- your position
- 11 that you have to know that it's regulated under the
- 12 chemical substances or Controlled Substances Act, it
- 13 seems to me is -- is contrary to the proposition that
- 14 ignorance of the law is no excuse. If you didn't
- 15 know -- I didn't know this was regulated, you would say
- 16 he's -- he's innocent because he didn't know the law.
- I thought your position was that you do have
- 18 to know, as in all the other cases in the mens rea area,
- 19 the -- the facts that make your conduct illegal. You
- 20 don't have to know that it's illegal.
- 21 MR. RUSSELL: That -- that is certainly our
- 22 principal position. We are willing to say, however,
- 23 that either -- whether you consider it a special
- 24 exception to that rule or a special application to that
- 25 rule, if the government can show that the defendant

- 1 knows that the substance is illegal under the statute of
- 2 conviction, that serves the basic purpose of the
- 3 knowledge of fact requirement, which is something --
- 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And if he doesn't
- 5 know, he's innocent.
- 6 MR. RUSSELL: If he does not --
- 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: If he's ignorant of
- 8 that law, he's not quilty.
- 9 MR. RUSSELL: Well, he's not guilty unless
- 10 the government can show that he knows that the substance
- 11 has the characteristics of -- of an analogue, in which
- 12 case his ignorance of the law is not an excuse.
- 13 So the government has two options: It can
- 14 prove the facts, the factual knowledge in the way that
- 15 this Court described in Staples and has applied in other
- 16 cases involving prohibited items. But we're willing to
- 17 acknowledge that if they can, instead of that, show that
- 18 he knew that this is illegal under the statute, that's
- 19 good enough because --
- 20 JUSTICE KAGAN: And -- and I take it that's
- 21 the same as under the Controlled Substances Act itself;
- 22 is that right? That's the analogy, is that you can
- 23 either show the person knew it was heroin or you can
- 24 show, well, the person didn't know it was heroin, but
- 25 the person did know that it was some drug that was on

- 1 Schedule I of the -- of -- and so a controlled
- 2 substance.
- 3 MR. RUSSELL: That's right. And where we
- 4 disagree with the government is that it construes some
- 5 of the lower court cases that say that as saying the
- 6 broader thing, which is --
- 7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. You keep
- 8 saying "knowing that it's illegal under the Act." He
- 9 doesn't have to know the Act. He just has to know it's
- 10 illegal, that some law regulates it; otherwise, he's not
- 11 going to know what the number of the law is or the
- 12 Controlled Substance Act.
- MR. RUSSELL: Well, let me be clear. When I
- 14 say --
- 15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I mean, criminals don't
- 16 care. They just know that this is -- they may think
- 17 it's something. They just know it's a controlled
- 18 substance.
- 19 MR. RUSSELL: No. I -- I would disagree
- 20 with that. And I think that's the principal
- 21 disagreement we have with the government here, is that
- 22 it's not enough to show that the defendant thinks that
- 23 it's illegal generally or that it's unlawful under an
- 24 import statute or State law.
- 25 JUSTICE SCALIA: All right. The -- the

- 1 government would say if he's selling it without paying
- 2 the sales tax, he knows that that's illegal, that's
- 3 enough to convict him under the Controlled Substances
- 4 Act.
- 5 MR. RUSSELL: Potentially, I -- I think
- 6 that that may be their argument, you know. So we give
- 7 the example in our brief of somebody who knows he's
- 8 selling Cuban cigars in violation of the import ban. He
- 9 knows in that case that it's an illegal or controlled
- 10 substance, but that knowledge doesn't equate -- you
- 11 wouldn't say that somebody in that case knows he's
- 12 selling a controlled substance, simply because it turns
- 13 out, unbeknownst to him, that the cigars have marijuana
- 14 in them.
- That's not the way that you use the English
- 16 language. You wouldn't say that he knowingly sold
- 17 marijuana or even that he knowingly controlled a -- sold
- 18 a controlled substance.
- 19 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, let's take the -- a
- 20 case involving a drug that isn't an analogue, a drug
- 21 that's actually listed. And let's say the -- the facts
- 22 are these: The distributor gives it to the person who's
- 23 going to make the distribution and says this is an
- 24 illegal drug, go distribute it. And the person then
- 25 goes and distributes it and tries to evade law

- 1 enforcement and so forth, is caught.
- Now, is it -- is that sufficient -- is that
- 3 evidence sufficient to take the case to the jury so the
- 4 jury can find -- the jury can decide whether there's
- 5 circumstantial evidence that the person who distributed
- 6 the drugs knew that it was a controlled substance under
- 7 Federal law as opposed to one of the few things that is
- 8 illegal under State law, but not under Federal law?
- 9 MR. RUSSELL: Yes, I think that's sufficient
- 10 evidence to go to the jury. The jury then has to decide
- 11 whether to make that inference. And in a case like this
- 12 where the defendant puts on countervailing evidence that
- 13 he, in fact, didn't believe it violated Federal law, or
- 14 when -- or if the defendant is able to explain, yeah, I
- 15 thought it was illegal because I thought it was in
- 16 violation of an import statute, then it's up to jury to
- 17 decide whether to believe that. But if it does, then it
- 18 ought to conclude that mens rea wasn't established
- 19 unless the government can show that the defendant knew
- 20 the characteristics of the substance that made it an
- 21 analogue.
- 22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Suppose the supplier
- 23 tells the dealer this substance produces exactly the
- 24 same effect as cocaine. Would that be enough to satisfy
- 25 the mens rea requirement?

- 1 MR. RUSSELL: It wouldn't be enough to
- 2 satisfy it. It may be evidence from which the jury
- 3 could draw an inference that the defendant knew that it
- 4 was a controlled substance under Federal law. I don't
- 5 think that they -- they should. I think it's -- it's
- 6 only partial evidence.
- 7 JUSTICE SCALIA: You -- you say he has to
- 8 know the -- the chemical makeup that causes it to be an
- 9 analogue. Right?
- 10 MR. RUSSELL: He either has to know that or
- 11 he has to know that it violates the CSA.
- 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: I understand. Let's assume
- 13 that he doesn't know that it violates the law. He also
- 14 doesn't know that it -- what the chemical makeup is.
- 15 But he knows what it is. It is MVD-3. That's all he
- 16 knows.
- Now, under the Controlled Substances Act,
- 18 that would be enough. He wouldn't have to know the
- 19 makeup of it. He would just have to know it's one of
- 20 the named controlled substances. If indeed MD-3 is --
- 21 is an analogue, why isn't that enough that he just knows
- 22 what it was and what it was is an analogue?
- 23 MR. RUSSELL: Right. I think that's
- 24 parallel to somebody knowing that he has an AR-15 rifle,
- 25 which is, in fact, a machine gun. In Staples, this

- 1 Court said that's not enough. You need to know the
- 2 facts about the gun that make it an analogue, which
- 3 isn't its name -- or which make it a machine gun, which
- 4 isn't its name. Here it's not the name --
- 5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, this isn't a rifle.
- 6 This is, in fact, an analogue of a controlled substance.
- 7 I mean, it's -- it's not a proper comparison.
- 8 MR. RUSSELL: With respect --
- 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: He knows that it is -- he
- 10 knows the identity of it. And -- and that chemical
- 11 is -- has, in fact, the characteristics that make it an
- 12 analogue.
- MR. RUSSELL: He knows -- knowing simply the
- 14 name of it doesn't tell you whether it's an analogue or
- 15 not. You don't know that it's an analogue simply
- 16 because you know the name. And the way that you
- 17 would --
- 18 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's true. And -- and
- 19 knowing that it's cocaine doesn't prove that you know
- 20 it's a controlled substance.
- 21 MR. RUSSELL: It -- it does though, because
- 22 the only fact that you need to know about cocaine for it
- 23 to be a controlled substance is that it is cocaine.
- 24 Because that's the fact that makes it illegal. It's
- 25 listed on the Controlled Substance Act and the

- 1 controlled substance schedules. So if it's cocaine, you
- 2 know everything you need to know, based on the
- 3 presumption that you know the law, to know that what
- 4 you're doing is illegal, and that's not true --
- 5 JUSTICE ALITO: Suppose -- suppose the
- 6 distributor gives it to the person who's going to
- 7 distribute it and says, here, distribute this and
- 8 there's the actual chemical formula on the container and
- 9 it's the chemical formula, excuse me, for PCP, whatever
- 10 that is, C-something H-something and -- so that's all a
- 11 person knows. He knows exactly what it is, the chemical
- 12 formula. Is that -- has he not committed a -- a crime
- 13 then?
- MR. RUSSELL: Under the ordinary
- 15 Controlled --
- 16 JUSTICE ALITO: Yes.
- 17 MR. RUSSELL: -- Substances Act?
- I don't know. I mean, it depends, I think,
- 19 on how it's listed in the schedule. I think the
- 20 schedule might, in fact, list the chemical name, but
- 21 if --
- 22 JUSTICE ALITO: It does list the chemical
- 23 name.
- 24 MR. RUSSELL: So then I think you do know
- 25 the fact that that makes the conduct unlawful.

- 1 JUSTICE ALITO: But you don't know -- the
- 2 person has just arrived, excuse me, from -- from Mars
- 3 and has no idea what -- you know, whether -- whether
- 4 it's legal or not.
- 5 MR. RUSSELL: I think the basic assumption
- 6 is that people know what the law is. They know what's
- 7 in the -- the schedules. And if you know what's in the
- 8 schedule and if you know the fact, that's enough, I
- 9 think, to convict.
- 10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What -- what do you do
- 11 with the actual facts of this case? That is, the
- 12 defendant gave names to what he was peddling. He called
- 13 it speed, Nu-Up, a replacement for the listed -- now
- 14 listed MPPD. He -- these were supposed to be bath
- 15 salts, but there's no bath salts in the world that cost
- 16 what those packets cost.
- 17 So what -- what do we make of what he was
- 18 advertising this to be, Speed-Up, and selling it at a
- 19 price that fits a controlled substance?
- 20 MR. RUSSELL: I think what it reflects --
- 21 what a jury certainly could find it to reflect, and I
- 22 think what the truth of the matter is, is that it shows
- 23 that Petitioner thought he'd found a loophole to the
- 24 Federal drug laws; that so long as something was not
- 25 listed on the schedules, even if it had drug-like

- 1 effects, he could sell it and he could sell it at
- 2 whatever price the market could bear.
- 3 You know, certainly, the government can
- 4 point to that kind of evidence to suggest that he knew
- 5 that his conduct violated the Controlled Substances Act.
- 6 But here, of course --
- 7 JUSTICE KAGAN: I -- I thought you said that
- 8 that kind of evidence was enough to get you to a jury,
- 9 right?
- 10 MR. RUSSELL: Yes.
- 11 JUSTICE KAGAN: That the defendant acted
- 12 furtively or that he sold these for incredibly inflated
- 13 prices, that all of that, it's not -- it's not the thing
- 14 itself, but it's evidence of the thing that the
- 15 government is trying to prove.
- 16 MR. RUSSELL: That's right. And I think it
- 17 gets to the jury, but it doesn't prove what the
- 18 government has to prove here, which is harmless error
- 19 beyond a reasonable doubt.
- 20 JUSTICE KAGAN: But then if I can just
- 21 understand. I mean, I think -- tell me if I'm wrong --
- 22 that the only thing that's possibly separating you and
- 23 the government -- we'll see if it is separating you and
- 24 the government -- is this question of what happens if
- 25 the defendant knew it was illegal under something other

- 1 than the CSA or the Analogue Act, right? And that's the
- 2 only point of potential difference between you and the
- 3 government?
- 4 MR. RUSSELL: I think that's true with
- 5 respect to our legal interpretation. I will say we also
- 6 think that you ought not to reach that because this
- 7 entire regulated status theory was raised for the first
- 8 time in the government's brief on the merits in this
- 9 Court --
- 10 JUSTICE SCALIA: Wait -- wait a minute. I
- 11 mean, yes, you do differ with the government on that.
- 12 MR. RUSSELL: Yes.
- 13 JUSTICE SCALIA: But -- but assuming that --
- 14 that the government cannot prove any belief in
- 15 illegality, the government would not say it therefore
- 16 must prove that you knew the chemical composition of
- 17 what you were selling. And you say, you have to know
- 18 the chemical composition.
- 19 MR. RUSSELL: Right. I -- I think we're all
- 20 on the same page. So just to be clear about our
- 21 position, I think that the only disagreement about the
- 22 meaning of the law between the government and us now is
- 23 this question of whether it's sufficient as a matter of
- law for the government to show that the defendant
- 25 believed that the substance was unlawful under some law

- 1 other than the CSA. They think that's sufficient; we
- 2 think it's not sufficient.
- 3 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. So --
- 4 MR. RUSSELL: Beyond that though --
- 5 JUSTICE KAGAN: And this is for --
- 6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Assuming it's not
- 7 sufficient, what -- what else does the government have
- 8 to prove? I think you differ on that.
- 9 MR. RUSSELL: I don't think so. I think the
- 10 government agrees that one way to prove the mens rea in
- 11 this case is to show that the defendant knew the
- 12 characteristics of the substance that made it an
- 13 analogue. They agree that they can do it that way.
- 14 JUSTICE SCALIA: Which means the chemical
- 15 composition?
- 16 MR. RUSSELL: Yes. Yes. I understand that
- 17 to be --
- 18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. We'll see.
- 19 MR. RUSSELL: -- their position.
- 20 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And who would that reach
- 21 other than the -- the chemist? The underground chemist
- 22 would be in a position to know that, but an ordinary
- 23 person would not.
- 24 MR. RUSSELL: I -- I acknowledge that giving
- 25 the statute what I think is a pretty straightforward

- 1 and -- and traditional reading does have the effect of
- 2 making it substantially harder for the government to
- 3 prove that mens rea for an ordinary layperson, but --
- 4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, my -- my under --
- 5 well, the government will tell you, but my understanding
- of the government is it would be enough if the defendant
- 7 knew the name -- the name of the drug, that it's blue
- 8 fly --
- 9 MR. RUSSELL: Now, if --
- 10 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- or whatever else. And
- 11 if, indeed, that drug has the chemical composition.
- MR. RUSSELL: I won't spend the Court's time
- 13 looking it up. I'm pretty confident that's not their
- 14 position.
- 15 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay.
- 16 MR. RUSSELL: That they'd said the opposite.
- 17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Suppose the court
- 18 instructs the jury that it's -- it suffices if the
- 19 defendant knows that this is an illegal drug because of
- 20 its hallucinogenic effect.
- 21 MR. RUSSELL: I don't think -- it -- again,
- 22 the critical question is illegal drug. If it -- by that
- 23 you mean illegal drug under the CSA.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: No. It's an illegal drug
- 25 because of its hallucinogenic effect. Maybe that's

- 1 incorrect because it has to be chemically the same, so
- 2 that's incomplete. But it seems to me that should
- 3 suffice for mens rea.
- 4 MR. RUSSELL: Just to be clear. I think a
- 5 court --
- 6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And, excuse me, and
- 7 then -- and then it's -- it's shown that this is
- 8 chemically similar.
- 9 MR. RUSSELL: Right. I think the Court
- 10 would have to tell the jury that you can take into
- 11 account the defendant's knowledge of its hallucinogenic
- 12 effect in deciding whether he knew it was illegal under
- 13 the Controlled Substances Act itself.
- And so what I'm quibbling with is just the
- 15 unadorned word "illegal." I don't think it would be
- 16 sufficient if a jury was convinced that the defendant
- 17 thought it's a hallucinogenic effect and it's illegal
- 18 under State law. That's why I was acting furtively.
- I don't think that a jury could, if it
- 20 believed that, find the mens rea established unless, of
- 21 course, it went under this factual knowledge prong.
- 22 That's -- that's the ordinary way in which knowledge of
- 23 unlawful possession of a prohibited item is proven.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: The -- the instructions at
- 25 page 14 of your brief -- the brief in footnote 9 -- can

- 1 you say that by adding just a sentence or two to the
- 2 first paragraph?
- 3 MR. RUSSELL: No. Because --
- 4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Or -- or is it beyond hope
- 5 or what?
- 6 MR. RUSSELL: No. I -- I think -- recall
- 7 that this is setting forth the elements. And so I think
- 8 the element is that the defendant has to know that he's
- 9 distributing an analogue. And then there's questions
- 10 about ways in which to prove that. And I think the
- 11 jury -- the -- the court could give an instruction of
- 12 the sort that we proposed, which said that the defendant
- 13 has to know that -- that this is an analogue within the
- 14 meaning. It has the characteristics that make it an
- 15 analogue within the meaning of the statute.
- 16 Had the government asked for an instruction,
- 17 it could have also given instructions that -- or the
- 18 government can show that the defendant knew the conduct
- 19 was unlawful generally. And you can make that -- or
- 20 unlawful under the CSA itself. And you can reach that
- 21 conclusion based on circumstantial evidence, including
- 22 evidence concerning the defendant's knowledge about the
- 23 drug's effect.
- But there's a world of difference between
- 25 saying that this is relevant circumstantial evidence

- 1 about whether the defendant knew that he was violating
- 2 the statute of conviction and what the government's
- 3 position is, which is once you prove that the defendant
- 4 knows that it's illegal at all, you're done. And the
- 5 jury is compelled to conclude that mens rea is
- 6 established. And I think that that's simply wrong.
- 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm sorry to put you
- 8 through this again, but it's important, I think for me
- 9 anyway, to get it right. I understand your -- your
- 10 understanding that the SG -- it's a big difference. The
- 11 SG says you have to know it's illegal under any law.
- 12 You say, no, under the CSA.
- Now, what was the other way in which you
- 14 disagree with the government?
- 15 MR. RUSSELL: I think that's the only way in
- 16 which we disagree about the meaning of the statute.
- 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No. But I thought
- 18 that you were disagreeing about names and
- 19 characteristics.
- 20 MR. RUSSELL: Well, I was disagreeing with
- 21 Justice Scalia. I don't think we're actually
- 22 disagreeing with the government about that because I
- 23 think they have said in their brief under the knowledge
- 24 of identity approach, they have to show that the
- 25 defendant knows the chemical structure and effects of

- 1 the analogue because it's not enough to simply know its
- 2 name. And so I don't think that we disagree with each
- 3 other on that.
- 4 JUSTICE KAGAN: Can I ask, Mr. Russell,
- 5 about your difference as to whether it's under this
- 6 statute or under any statute?
- 7 If you look at some of the instructions that
- 8 are given just under the CSA, not analogues, that some
- 9 of the instructions just say that you need to find that
- 10 the defendant knew that he was distributing some kind of
- 11 prohibited drug. And they don't say a drug prohibited
- 12 under the CSA. So if we use that as the analogy here,
- 13 that would suggest that -- that the -- the jury wouldn't
- 14 need to find the -- the analogue prohibited under the
- 15 CSA in the Analogue Act, but just that they knew it was
- 16 prohibited by something.
- 17 MR. RUSSELL: Right. I think there is an
- 18 ambiguity in those instructions, whether it's referring
- 19 to unlawfulness generally, or unlawfulness under the
- 20 CSA. I think courts -- what they really mean is under
- 21 the CSA. And in the cases where the defendant has come
- 22 forward and said, actually, I thought it was illegal
- 23 under some other statute, in Hassan and again in
- 24 Hussein, and -- and, I believe, the case of Morales.
- 25 Three of the seven cases the government cites for this

- 1 proposition, the Court has said, no, that's not good
- 2 enough. And those are -- and that makes complete sense.
- Now, it -- it could be that in a lot of
- 4 cases the government is going to present evidence that
- 5 the defendant just thinks it's -- it's a controlled
- 6 substance generally. And we agree that a jury can
- 7 infer, absent other evidence, that he thought it was
- 8 illegal under the CSA itself. But you have to leave
- 9 open the possibility that the jury can, in a case like
- 10 this, say, actually, no, he -- the evidence doesn't show
- 11 that he believed it was lawful -- unlawful under the CSA
- 12 because he looked at the schedules, and he quite
- 13 reasonably believed that if they weren't on the
- 14 schedules, they weren't illegal.
- I mean, I will acknowledge, the only reason
- 16 that they are illegal if they're not on the schedule is
- 17 the existence of the Analogue Act. And I'll acknowledge
- 18 that prior to this case, I didn't know about the
- 19 Analogue Act, and I think a lot of people didn't.
- 20 And in the community where -- where my
- 21 client was selling these things, these things were being
- 22 sold openly in delis and gas stations that were being
- 23 advertised in local newspapers and magazines. And
- 24 that's, I think, consistent with the -- the fact that
- 25 lots of people entertain the incorrect notion that if

- 1 something's not on -- on the schedules, then it's legal
- 2 to sell. And somebody who is ignorant to that --
- 3 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, and you don't defend
- 4 that, right? I mean, ignorance of the law is no excuse.
- 5 MR. RUSSEL: It's no excuse.
- 6 JUSTICE SCALIA: You would agree that, even
- 7 though you're totally ignorant that it's on the Analogue
- 8 Act, if you know the chemical composition and it happens
- 9 to be on the analogue -- covered by the Analogue Act,
- 10 they got you; right?
- 11 MR. RUSSELL: No. I -- let me try to make
- 12 clear my position.
- We agree that if the government can prove
- 14 that you had the factual knowledge that the chemical has
- 15 the characteristics that make it -- it an analogue,
- 16 ignorance of the law is no excuse.
- 17 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, wait. Wait. Wait.
- 18 Wait.
- MR. RUSSELL: We do not --
- 20 JUSTICE SCALIA: What -- what does that
- 21 mean?
- 22 MR. RUSSELL: So --
- 23 JUSTICE SCALIA: I know all of the chemical
- 24 characteristics. Okay? I have to, in addition, know
- 25 that those characteristics make it an analogue?

- 1 MR. RUSSELL: No.
- 2 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay.
- 3 MR. RUSSELL: So there -- there are three
- 4 options.
- 5 The one is that you proposed, they know the
- 6 name of the -- of the substance.
- 7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Right. You -- you reject
- 8 that.
- 9 MR. RUSSELL: We don't think -- we don't
- 10 think that's enough.
- 11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Right.
- 12 MR. RUSSELL: If they know that the -- the
- 13 substance is chemically substantially similar to a
- 14 controlled substance, then they know the fact that makes
- its possession unlawful under that realm. They have to
- 16 know, as well, that it's substantially similar and
- 17 represented actual fact.
- 18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, suppose -- I mean,
- 19 I'm not a chemist. I don't know that it's substantially
- 20 similar, but I do know what the chemical composition is.
- 21 I have to, in addition, know that that chemical
- 22 composition is substantially similar?
- MR. RUSSELL: Yes.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't think so. I think
- 25 if I know the chemical composition and, in fact, that is

- 1 substantially similar --
- 2 MR. RUSSELL: Well.
- 3 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- they got you.
- 4 MR. RUSSELL: I think -- I think we disagree
- 5 about that. But if you take that view, we still win
- 6 this case because there's no evidence that Petitioner
- 7 knew anything about the chemical structure of -- of what
- 8 he was selling here.
- 9 JUSTICE BREYER: I assume your argument is
- 10 simply that it's a kind of coincidence. You have to
- 11 know that this substance is an analogue, and there are
- 12 two ways you could know that. One way you could know it
- is you could know what the chemical composition of this
- 14 is and what the chemical composition of, say, cocaine
- 15 is. That would be one way. Very few people other than
- 16 chemists know that.
- 17 Then there is a second way you could know.
- 18 The second way you could know is that you know that it
- 19 is forbidden by a law which has the title forbidding
- 20 analogues. And if you happen to know that it falls
- 21 within that, of course you know it's an analogue because
- 22 you know it falls within it. And those are the two
- 23 ways.
- 24 MR. RUSSELL: Yes.
- 25 JUSTICE BREYER: And no one's been able to

- 1 think of a third.
- 2 And ignorance of the law is no excuse has
- 3 nothing to do with this case. This is just a
- 4 coincidence that those are the two ways you could know
- 5 it was an analogue.
- 6 MR. RUSSELL: Well, I certainly agree that
- 7 those are the two ways that you can know that it is an
- 8 analogue. And I don't think that -- that the government
- 9 can even argue that it satisfied that burden in this
- 10 case, much less that the jury would have been compelled
- 11 to find that harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
- 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: But -- but you say that the
- 13 government has to prove knowledge of two chemical
- 14 compositions: The chemical composition of what is being
- 15 sold, but also, the chemical composition of one of the
- 16 items on the -- on the list of controlled substances.
- 17 MR. RUSSELL: Yes. Yes. That is -- that is
- 18 our position. And that --
- 19 JUSTICE KAGAN: But only if that's the
- 20 government's theory. Only if the government goes that
- 21 route rather than the route of just saying you knew it
- 22 was an analogue.
- 23 MR. RUSSELL: That is correct. And, you
- 24 know, I will acknowledge that going the knowledge of
- 25 identity route in an analogue case is going to be

- 1 different -- difficult for nonchemists.
- But I think it's difficult for reasons that
- 3 should not give the Court pause, which is simply that
- 4 it's difficult for somebody to know, even if they know
- 5 what the law is, whether what they're doing is illegal
- 6 or not. And so, you know, our theory has the benefit of
- 7 avoiding entirely the vagueness problems that we think
- 8 are inherent in this statute.
- 9 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Was there enough evidence
- 10 in this case to go to the jury under the instruction
- 11 that you want?
- MR. RUSSELL: Yes. I will agree that there
- 13 was.
- And so the only question here is whether
- 15 there should be a new trial under which we can have
- 16 another discussion with the -- with the district court
- 17 about what the proper instructions are -- I don't think
- 18 we will have a lot of disagreement about that -- or
- 19 whether the court should instead hold that there is
- 20 harmless.
- 21 And it would be exceedingly unfair to do
- 22 that in this case on the ground that Petitioner didn't
- 23 prevent -- present sufficient evidence to rebut a theory
- 24 the government wasn't making at trial. That's why we
- 25 have and why we enforce forfeiture rules.

- 1 And this Court could, I think, quite easily
- 2 resolve this case by saying, as Justice Breyer did, here
- 3 is the legal rule, here are the two ways in which this
- 4 can be proven, but the government in this case, to the
- 5 extent it has some special new theory about illegal
- 6 under some other law has waived that argument by failing
- 7 to preserve it.
- 8 If I could reserve the remainder of my time.
- 9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- 10 Ms. Harrington.
- 11 ORAL ARGUMENT OF SARAH E. HARRINGTON
- 12 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
- 13 MS. HARRINGTON: Thank you, Mr. Chief
- 14 Justice, and may it please the Court:
- 15 My friend, Mr. Russell, is almost correct
- 16 about the extent of the disagreement that's left in this
- 17 case. Our position is not that we can prevail if we can
- 18 prove that the defendant believed that his conduct was
- 19 illegal under some law other than the CSA or the
- 20 Analogue Act. Our position is that we can prevail if we
- 21 can prove that a defendant knowingly distributed a drug
- 22 and that he believed that his conduct, that his
- 23 distribution of the drug was illegal, generally.
- 24 As Justice Sotomayor has --
- 25 JUSTICE BREYER: My question is -- that I

- 1 posed to him is really for you.
- 2 MS. HARRINGTON: Would you mind repeating
- 3 it?
- 4 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, I'll try.
- 5 Suppose you have to show, and I think you
- 6 do, that the defendant did know it is an analogue, say
- 7 to cocaine. There are two ways you could do that. The
- 8 first way is you could show that this defendant, being a
- 9 graduate in chemistry, knows what the chemical
- 10 composition of cocaine is, knows what the chemical
- 11 composition of this other substance is, and knows they
- 12 are the same. You're not going to be able to do that
- 13 very often.
- 14 MS. HARRINGTON: Right.
- 15 JUSTICE BREYER: Another possibility is you
- 16 could show that he knows that this particular substance
- 17 is banned by a law that is called the -- the Analogue
- 18 Act, because obviously if he knows that it is banned by
- 19 the Act that bans analogues, it must be an analogue.
- 20 Those are two ways you could prove knowledge.
- 21 To prove that it is banned by the
- 22 Anti-Turkey Shoot Act proves nothing about his knowledge
- 23 that this is an analogue. And, therefore, once you say,
- 24 as you are trying to say, I think, that some other
- 25 illegality is enough to convict, I no longer understand

- 1 the argument.
- 2 MS. HARRINGTON: Well, the argument, as
- 3 Justice Sotomayor pointed out, in the real world,
- 4 defendants don't tend to know specific provisions of
- 5 Federal law or State law, but they do tend to know
- 6 whether what they're doing is illegal or not. And so
- 7 our view is that the knowing or intentional standard in
- 8 Section 841(a) describes a culpable state of mind. And
- 9 one way to prove that culpable state of mind is to prove
- 10 that the defendant knowingly or intentionally engaged in
- 11 the act --
- 12 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes, but then you're not --
- 13 then you are saying the defendant does not have to know
- 14 it is an analogue, and that, I think, you don't want to
- 15 say.
- MS. HARRINGTON: Well, what we're saying --
- 17 JUSTICE BREYER: Because you could think it
- 18 was banned by some other act, and that would make you
- 19 know that it is that thing that the other act bans. It
- 20 doesn't tend to show it's an analogue.
- 21 MS. HARRINGTON: Right. Well, what I'm
- 22 saying is defendants tend to believe that what they're
- 23 doing is illegal, not under any particular provision,
- 24 but just generally they believe it's illegal. And we --
- 25 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's not what the statute

- 1 says. The statute doesn't say knowingly be a bad guy.
- 2 It says knowingly manufacture, distribute, or dispense a
- 3 controlled substance.
- 4 MS. HARRINGTON: Yes, and it --
- 5 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's what the knowingly
- 6 applies to. So you have to know that it violates that
- 7 law, not just know that you're -- you're a bad guy.
- 8 That doesn't -- that's not what it says.
- 9 MS. HARRINGTON: Well, in almost every
- 10 context, the easiest way to prove knowledge of -- of
- 11 this kind of statute is to prove that the defendant knew
- 12 the facts that made his conduct illegal.
- 13 JUSTICE SCALIA: Right.
- 14 MS. HARRINGTON: But what the knowing --
- 15 JUSTICE SCALIA: Under the statute.
- 16 MS. HARRINGTON: But just to prove the
- 17 facts. He doesn't have to have any awareness of the
- 18 statute, but if he knows all the facts, which in this
- 19 case would include knowledge of the chemical structure
- 20 and pharmacological effects, that's usually, in other
- 21 contexts, the easiest way to prove knowledge under this
- 22 kind of statute.
- 23 In this context, that's not the easiest way,
- 24 and we think there is another way. We think the knowing
- 25 or intentional standard describe the culpable mental

- 1 state, and this Court has said that that's -- that to
- 2 prove knowledge, you don't always have to prove that the
- 3 defendant knew all the -- the critical facts.
- 4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: How do you answer the --
- 5 the Cuban cigar that turns out to be filled with
- 6 marijuana?
- 7 MS. HARRINGTON: Well, I guess our primary
- 8 submission is that it's sufficient if the government
- 9 proves that a defendant distributed a drug and that he
- 10 believed that doing so was illegal under some drug law;
- 11 that he knew it was some kind of illegal drug. We think
- 12 it would be --
- 13 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, it has to be under
- 14 some drug law.
- MS. HARRINGTON: Well, we think --
- 16 JUSTICE SCALIA: You didn't say this before,
- 17 and I don't think your brief said it. It has to be
- 18 illegal under some other drug law.
- 19 MS. HARRINGTON: Well, just -- let me just
- 20 point out the reason there's maybe not as much
- 21 explication in the briefs is because there's a
- 22 fundamental disagreement that became clear in the reply
- 23 brief that -- that we disagree with Petitioner about
- 24 what the courts of appeals have done in the CSA context.
- 25 And I can get to that in a second.

- 1 But we think certainly it's sufficient if a
- 2 defendant believes that what he's doing is illegal under
- 3 a drug law, that he's distributing an illegal drug. We
- 4 think it would be consistent with sort of broader
- 5 principles if the Court held more broadly than that,
- 6 that he believed that his conduct was illegal generally.
- 7 You don't need to go that far in this case. The breadth
- 8 of that hasn't fully been briefed in this case.
- 9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But the problem -- I
- 10 mean, that highlights what I think is the practical
- 11 difference here. You've got a defendant who is
- 12 obviously -- knows something's out there. He's trying
- 13 not to do something, whether it's not to violate the CSA
- or whether it's not to violate anything. And you just
- 15 want to be able to show to the jury, look, something is
- 16 bothering him. He knows that something's afoot, and --
- 17 and that's all you want to be -- have to prove, as
- 18 opposed to he knows he's violating either the CSA or a
- 19 drug law.
- 20 MS. HARRINGTON: Well, we --
- 21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And I just don't
- 22 know how that works. I understand how that works in
- 23 this case, because you just say to the jury, look,
- 24 he's -- he's checking the schedule every day, he's doing
- 25 this, he's doing that. But I'm a little concerned about

- 1 extending that as a general matter, where it doesn't
- 2 have to be the law in -- one, because I think usually
- 3 it's not a question whether you know anything about the
- 4 law at all, it's simply whether you know a question
- 5 about the facts, and whether that happens to bring it
- 6 under the law.
- 7 But then I don't know how broad the
- 8 principle is that you just have to know what you're
- 9 doing is -- would raise a doubt in the jury's mind about
- 10 whether you knew it was legal or not.
- 11 MS. HARRINGTON: Well, so I -- I have two
- 12 types of responses, which I'll just point out so that I
- 13 can come back to them in case I don't get through them
- 14 all. The first is a doctrinal point. And second, I can
- 15 give you sort of a real world example of how this works
- 16 in the CSA context.
- 17 The doctrinal point is that this Court has
- 18 held that there are other ways to prove knowledge other
- 19 than that a defendant actually knew a critical fact.
- 20 For example, the government can prove willful blindness.
- 21 And the Court has explained, as recently as the
- 22 Global-Tech case, that the reason you allow willful
- 23 blindness to substitute for knowledge is not because
- 24 being willfully blind to a fact is the same as knowing
- 25 the fact. It's because a person who is willfully blind

- 1 to a fact has the same culpable state of mind as the
- 2 person who knows the fact.
- 3 And so we would submit that a person who
- 4 engages in an act intentionally and correctly believes
- 5 that doing that is illegal is at least as culpable, if
- 6 not more culpable, than the person who knows all the
- 7 facts that make his conduct illegal.
- 8 And so the real world --
- 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: He thought he was violating
- 10 a sales tax law, and you're going to send him up the
- 11 river for 15 years.
- MS. HARRINGTON: Well, again, we believe
- 13 that --
- 14 JUSTICE SCALIA: You think he's just as
- 15 culpable?
- 16 MS. HARRINGTON: We don't think the Court
- 17 needs to hold that in this case. We think certainly
- 18 it's sufficient if the government can prove that a
- 19 defendant knowingly distributed a drug believing it to
- 20 be illegal to do so, whether or not he knew what
- 21 provision of law --
- 22 JUSTICE BREYER: It's illegal because, in
- 23 fact, it's bad for animals, and the law involved --
- 24 prevents veterinarians from using this kind of drug for
- 25 animal treatment. That's all he knows. That's all he

- 1 thinks.
- Now, he's guilty of this statute? That
- 3 doesn't tend to show at all that knowledge that he knows
- 4 it's an analogue. But in your view, because he feels
- 5 guilty, as perhaps he should, he's guilty of violating
- 6 this law.
- 7 MS. HARRINGTON: Well, we do believe that
- 8 that would establish the necessary culpable state of
- 9 mind. But again, the Court doesn't really need --
- 10 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, why? Can you give me
- 11 any authority for that? I mean, your example of willful
- 12 blindness is an example of where, in fact, in respect to
- 13 this law, he knows there is a risk he is violating doing
- 14 the conduct that it -- that it permits, he knows there
- is a serious risk, and he pays no attention to that at
- 16 all.
- 17 MS. HARRINGTON: Well, we do think it's
- 18 fine --
- 19 JUSTICE BREYER: That's not a very strong
- 20 analogy, I don't think.
- 21 MS. HARRINGTON: Well, but I think what it
- 22 shows is that you don't have to prove actual knowledge
- 23 of a fact to satisfy a knowledge standard in a statute.
- 24 And again, we think it would be perfectly sufficient for
- 25 the Court to hold in this case that when the government

- 1 proved the defendant is distributing an illicit drug for
- 2 human consumption and he believes that what he's doing
- 3 is illegal, and he is correct about that, then that is
- 4 enough to -- to satisfy the CSA or the Analogue Act.
- 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, it might be except
- 6 that there is some evidence in this case different than
- 7 what you're saying. He checked, according to his
- 8 brother, the Controlled Substance Act; didn't see this
- 9 listed. And also when he was told something was
- 10 illegal, he flushed it down the toilet.
- 11 So why isn't -- why don't we leave this to
- 12 the court below to figure out whether the error was
- harmless or not, given the evidence in the case?
- 14 MS. HARRINGTON: I certainly acknowledge
- 15 that that is the Court's usual, to remand for
- 16 application of a harmless error standard, and we
- 17 wouldn't have any problem with the Court doing that
- 18 here.
- We do think the evidence that you point
- 20 tends to show that he may not have believed he was
- 21 violating the CSA specifically, but he -- there is
- 22 plenty of evidence to show that he knew and correctly
- 23 believed that what he was doing was illegal. He sold
- 24 his products in little baggies and vials --
- 25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. He has to

- 1 know that it's a controlled substance?
- 2 MS. HARRINGTON: He has to know that it's a
- 3 controlled substance analogue. Where we differ is how
- 4 you prove that --
- 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Not even an analogue,
- 6 because plenty of people sell things thinking it's maybe
- 7 cocaine, but in fact, it's crack, or they sell something
- 8 else thinking that it's a different drug, they just know
- 9 it's a drug.
- 10 MS. HARRINGTON: We totally -- we are
- 11 100 percent on the same page as you. I think Petitioner
- 12 believes --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Yeah, but you keep
- 14 saying has to know it's an analogue. I think that's
- 15 wrong. He just has to know it's a controlled substance.
- 16 MS. HARRINGTON: Right. But I mean -- but
- 17 by controlled substance, what we don't mean -- this is
- 18 where we differ with Petitioner -- we don't mean that he
- 19 has to know that it's illegal under Control Substances
- 20 Act. That's Petitioner's position. That's not our
- 21 position.
- 22 JUSTICE ALITO: Is this a real world
- 23 problem? This sounds to me like the most artificial
- 24 distinction that I've heard in a long time. Is there --
- 25 does Virginia have an Analogue Act? This is from

- 1 Virginia, right?
- 2 MS. HARRINGTON: Yes.
- 3 JUSTICE ALITO: Does have Virginia have an
- 4 Analogue Act that's different from the Federal Analogue
- 5 Act?
- 6 MS. HARRINGTON: I do not know that -- the
- 7 answer to that question. Let --
- 8 JUSTICE ALITO: Do the States typically have
- 9 Analogue Acts, period, or do they have Analogue Acts
- 10 that are different from the State Analogue Acts? You
- 11 know, all of these cases -- unless this case involves a
- 12 chemist, your proof that a person knew the thing was an
- analogue is going to be that this person engaged in all
- 14 kinds of furtive conduct to try to hide it from -- from
- 15 law enforcement.
- And so it's going to be for the -- for the
- 17 jury to -- to determine, based on circumstantial
- 18 evidence, whether the person knew that this thing was
- 19 illegal under some law. And if it's not the Federal
- 20 Controlled Substances Act, I don't know what act it's
- 21 going to be. The defense is going to be, well, you
- 22 know, I knew that it was illegal, but I thought it was
- 23 illegal under the State Analogue Act, it wasn't illegal
- 24 under the Federal Controlled Substances Act. Is that
- 25 what we're worrying about here?

- 1 MS. HARRINGTON: I think that sort of gets
- 2 to the point, I mean, the way you sort of characterize
- 3 what might be the right instruction, that you have to
- 4 prove that the defendant knew it was -- or believed it
- 5 was illegal under some drug law, we're fine with that.
- 6 I think Petitioner would like the instruction to be that
- 7 you have to -- the government has to prove that the
- 8 defendant knew it was illegal under the Controlled
- 9 Substances Act or under the Analogue Act.
- 10 JUSTICE ALITO: Yeah, and the question I'm
- 11 asking, a practical question is, we've got the Federal
- 12 Controlled Substances Act, the Analogue provision. What
- is this other -- what is this other body of law that
- 14 might come into play here?
- MS. HARRINGTON: Well, I'm not sure there is
- 16 one, but I think our point is that the defendant -- most
- 17 defendants don't -- aren't aware of any body of law,
- 18 right? They just know that what they're doing is
- 19 illegal, and so we shouldn't have to prove that he had a
- 20 specific -- a specific statute of conviction in his
- 21 mind --
- 22 JUSTICE KAGAN: Ms. Harrington, I mean, I
- 23 take your points that this is going to have a very small
- 24 practical effect in terms of what either the prosecutor
- 25 or the defense attorney is -- is putting on at trial.

- 1 But it actually seems to me to be a real theoretical
- 2 difference, which has implications far beyond this case.
- 3 Then what Mr. Russell has suggested is two
- 4 ways of showing that a defendant knew a fact. That the
- 5 fact that he was distributing an analogue, and you might
- 6 know it because you know the chemical structure and all
- 7 its properties, or you might know it because you know --
- 8 you know, somebody has given you a box and said, this is
- 9 an analogue prohibited under the Analogue Act, and so
- 10 you know that it's an analogue.
- 11 So those are two ways of knowing a fact.
- 12 But you're saying that in addition to knowing a fact,
- 13 the mens rea is satisfied if you can just show that the
- 14 defendant knew he was acting culpably in violation of
- 15 some law. And that, it seems to me, is a theory that
- 16 could be put on to any law. That in addition to knowing
- 17 all the facts that a statute says you have to know, the
- 18 government has an alternative way of proving its case,
- 19 which is just to say, oh, look at -- look, you were
- 20 acting culpably. You knew you were doing something
- 21 wrong.
- 22 MS. HARRINGTON: Yes, and again, you know,
- 23 we would embrace a narrower articulation in this case of
- 24 what your knowledge of illegality has to be. If you
- 25 know you're violating a U.S. drug law or you know you

- 1 are distributing an illegal drug, we think that's
- 2 sufficient --
- 3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Suppose he thought that
- 4 there was a labeling law and he was violating a labeling
- 5 law. He's wrong, there is no labeling law, but it
- 6 violates the Analogue Act. Guilty?
- 7 MS. HARRINGTON: Under our view, that would
- 8 be sufficient. We don't think the Court needs to reach
- 9 that in this case because there's no suggestion that
- 10 he -- that his belief in illegality was that he was
- 11 doing anything other than distributing an illicit drug,
- 12 that he was violating some U.S. drug law.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: So you -- so you -- just
- 14 to clarify, you -- you are saying it's not just any
- 15 illegality, it has to be an -- a drug law that's --
- 16 that's a qualification.
- MS. HARRINGTON: We're saying at least for
- 18 the purposes of this case, that is sufficient.
- 19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What do you mean by "for
- 20 purposes of this case"? What is the law generally?
- 21 Must it be a drug law or could it be any law?
- 22 MS. HARRINGTON: Well, we think it's --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Why don't you give it up,
- 24 Ms. Harrington? I mean --
- 25 MS. HARRINGTON: Let me just try one more

- 1 time.
- 2 (Laughter.)
- 3 MS. HARRINGTON: We think it would be
- 4 sufficient -- it would be consistent with the way this
- 5 Court has treated other mens rea issues such as, you
- 6 know, willful standard.
- 7 JUSTICE BREYER: We've got the willful. I
- 8 don't think the problem is with your articulation.
- 9 MS. HARRINGTON: Well, let me --
- 10 JUSTICE BREYER: I think the problem is
- 11 we're sitting here thinking of examples like, you know,
- 12 there's an anti-bird hunting statute, and it says you
- 13 cannot hunt green-eyed turkey's, you know, and the guy
- 14 has never heard of that, and you say, okay, I don't know
- if this is a green-eyed turkey, and I don't know if it
- 16 violates the green-eyed turkey statute, but maybe it
- 17 violates something. You know, and that sounds like an
- 18 odd principle, even if you limit to all laws concerning
- 19 birds. And -- do you see the problem?
- 20 MS. HARRINGTON: I -- I understand the
- 21 Court's concern.
- JUSTICE BREYER: And I suddenly worry the
- 23 government's going to start -- he's skulking around in
- 24 the bushes, you see.
- 25 (Laughter.)

- 1 MS. HARRINGTON: Well, I think --
- 2 JUSTICE BREYER: We can go on like this, but
- 3 I think I better not.
- 4 MS. HARRINGTON: So I think that has -- and
- 5 that turned out to be a real world problem, and I
- 6 certainly understand the Court's concern, and I'm not
- 7 trying to sort of blow it off or avoid answering it. I
- 8 do think in the willful context, that that has -- the
- 9 Court in Bryan said that's sufficient if -- if the --
- 10 the defendant correctly believes that what he's doing is
- illegal, he doesn't have to have any sense of what law
- 12 he's violating.
- Now, willfulness is generally thought to be
- 14 a much higher mens rea standard than knowing or
- intentional, and although this Court has never addressed
- 16 this precise question, both the model penal code and the
- 17 Brown Commission Report have embraced the idea that when
- 18 you satisfy a higher mens rea standard, you necessarily
- 19 satisfy all the lower ones. Having said that, I
- 20 understand the Court's concern -- I don't mean to
- 21 interrupt you, Mr. Chief Justice -- but -- and so we are
- 22 embracing a narrower articulation for the purposes of
- 23 this case.
- 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but you say
- 25 you're embracing the narrower articulation, but it seems

- 1 to me that's just a case-specific one, and Justice Alito
- 2 is right, it's hard to see how that would make a
- 3 difference here. But I think it could make a world of
- 4 difference when you expand that to the other cases
- 5 involving mens rea. And when you get to that point, it
- 6 is sort of an ignorance of the law question. I mean, in
- 7 all the cases involving mens rea, we do not ask whether
- 8 you have any idea whether it violates the law or not.
- 9 MS. HARRINGTON: Well, in the --
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And -- and we --
- 11 your position makes it much easier to convict people
- 12 because you don't have to show that they even knew the
- 13 facts that made their conduct illegal. All you have to
- 14 do is say that -- under -- illegal under the law that
- 15 they're being charged. All you have to do is say, they
- 16 did something that makes it look like they knew that --
- 17 they did something that makes it look that they were
- 18 suspicious. And if we can find any law in the
- 19 United States Code that makes what they did illegal, we
- 20 can prosecute them for what we want to prosecute them
- 21 for, even though they didn't know that the facts fell
- 22 under that provision.
- 23 MS. HARRINGTON: Well, you have to prosecute
- 24 them for the -- for the -- for the actions they actually
- 25 took that broke the law, I mean --

- 1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes, and part of
- 2 that prosecution is you must show that they had the
- 3 requisite mens rea.
- 4 MS. HARRINGTON: Yes.
- 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And what you're
- 6 saying is, we can show that simply by showing the jury
- 7 that they were acting suspiciously.
- 8 MS. HARRINGTON: I mean, I don't think
- 9 that's quite correct. We have to convince the jury that
- 10 the defendant in any case believed that what he was
- 11 doing -- that the relevant conduct, which is in this
- 12 case would be distributing the drug, violated the law,
- 13 was illegal. You have to prove that beyond a reasonable
- 14 doubt. And so just merely suggesting to the jury that a
- defendant was acting suspiciously, I think is not going
- 16 to get the job done in most cases.
- 17 And I do think in most contexts it is easier
- 18 to prove that a defendant knows the facts that make his
- 19 conduct illegal than it is to prove that he knew what he
- 20 was doing was illegal --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: What's the best case you
- 22 can give us to help? In Morissette, the defendant
- 23 didn't know that the surplus shell casings belonged to
- 24 the government. And he was exonerated because he had to
- 25 have an intent. Suppose that he -- he didn't know they

- 1 belonged to the government, but he thought that it was
- 2 an illegal casing because it was dangerous. And he was
- 3 wrong about that. But it did wrong -- could he be
- 4 prosecuted then?
- 5 MS. HARRINGTON: We think he -- we think he
- 6 could be. I mean, I think all of the cases that -- in
- 7 that line, the Morissette, Staples, all of those cases
- 8 involved defendants who claimed that they genuinely --
- 9 genuinely believed what they were doing was innocent.
- 10 And so the problem for this Court was to try to figure
- 11 out a way to construe the statute so that it didn't
- 12 sweep in people who really were innocent. Now, this is
- 13 a case where --
- 14 JUSTICE KENNEDY: What -- what -- is there a
- 15 case you have for us?
- 16 MS. HARRINGTON: So -- so -- the easier
- 17 cases where the defendant really truly believes that
- 18 what he's doing is illegal, and those cases tend not to
- 19 come to this Court. There are some statements in the
- 20 opinion in Bryan. Now, Bryan was principally a case
- 21 about the willful standard, but there is also a
- 22 discussion of a knowledge standard. And in Bryan, the
- 23 Court said the government doesn't necessarily have to
- 24 prove that a defendant knew what he was doing was
- 25 illegal, and I think the use of necessarily there

- 1 suggests -- at least leaves open the possibility that if
- 2 the government did prove that, then it would be
- 3 sufficient. The Court also said --
- 4 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's the best you have?
- 5 MS. HARRINGTON: The Court -- the Court also
- 6 said in Bryan that the defendant -- that the government
- 7 merely needs to prove knowledge of the facts to make his
- 8 conduct illegal, suggesting that that's an easier
- 9 standard for the government to meet.
- 10 JUSTICE SCALIA: Just --
- 11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Let me just follow
- 12 up -- I'm sorry, just to follow up quickly on Justice
- 13 Kennedy's hypothetical, what if he knew he was
- 14 trespassing when he went on to the government property
- 15 and -- and took the casings? You have to show he knew
- 16 what he was doing was illegal, he was trespassing. The
- 17 sign said government property. And so we can convict
- 18 him for taking the shell casings.
- 19 MS. HARRINGTON: Well, we would we would tie
- 20 it more directly to the conduct that actually violates
- 21 the law. And so if -- if he needs to know that the
- 22 taking of the shell casings is illegal, not that some
- 23 ancillary conduct that, you know, brought him to the
- 24 shell casings was illegal. And so here we would say,
- 25 again, he needs -- the defendant needs to know that the

- 1 distribution of the drug is what's illegal. And we
- 2 think, you know, if you look at the -- I think we're on
- 3 the same page with Petitioner in suggesting that the
- 4 same standard should govern both CSA cases and analogue
- 5 cases. We just disagree about how the courts of appeals
- 6 have applied this in the CSA context.
- 7 JUSTICE ALITO: Let me try this out.
- 8 Start with a drug that is on the list. All
- 9 right. The defendant knows the chemical composition of
- 10 the drug that's on the list. The defendant has no idea
- 11 that this is on the list, knows nothing about the
- 12 Federal drug laws. This person distributes it
- 13 intentionally, knowingly.
- 14 That person has violated the law. The
- 15 person's ignorance of the fact that this is a controlled
- 16 substance is irrelevant. Are you -- am I right so far?
- 17 MS. HARRINGTON: Yes, because he knows the
- 18 identity of the drug.
- 19 JUSTICE ALITO: He knows -- he knows what it
- 20 is.
- 21 MS. HARRINGTON: Yes.
- 22 JUST ALITO: So he knows the chemical
- 23 composition. He knows the name. All right.
- Now, let's assume that we have a list of
- 25 analogues. It's the same thing. If the defendant knows

- 1 that the thing is on the list, knows the chemical
- 2 composition of it, and it turns out that this is an
- 3 analogue, that is sufficient. That's not going to be
- 4 the proof in most cases.
- 5 And I think maybe the confusion is that the
- 6 defendant -- a defendant's knowledge of the illegality
- 7 of what he or she is doing is not something that has to
- 8 be proven. It is circumstantial evidence that the
- 9 person knows that the thing that is being distributed is
- 10 something that is on the list.
- MS. HARRINGTON: Right. And, again, there's
- 12 no list in the analogue context. It's --
- 13 JUSTICE ALITO: I understand that.
- MS. HARRINGTON: Okay.
- 15 JUSTICE ALITO: But it makes it easier to
- 16 understand --
- 17 MS. HARRINGTON: Yes.
- 18 JUSTICE ALITO: -- if we imagine that there
- 19 is.
- 20 MS. HARRINGTON: Yes. So, no, we agree.
- Our position is that if we can proof that a
- 22 defendant knew what he was doing was illegal, that's a
- 23 way of proving that he knew he was distributing a
- 24 controlled substance analogue or a controlled substance.
- 25 JUSTICE ALITO: But it's not something that

- 1 you have to prove. You don't have to prove that he knew
- 2 that it was illegal under Federal law, or under State
- 3 law, or under any other law.
- 4 You have to prove that he knew that it was a
- 5 substance that constitutes -- that, in fact, constitutes
- 6 an analogue.
- 7 But the fact that he knows that it's illegal
- 8 under Federal law is circumstantial evidence that he
- 9 knew that it was something that fell within that
- 10 definition.
- 11 MS. HARRINGTON: Yes. And it might help if
- 12 I could give you sort of a real world example of how
- 13 this has worked in the courts of appeals under the CSA.
- 14 There's a number of -- of cases in the -- in
- 15 the courts of appeals dealing with a substance called
- 16 khat, which is K-H-A-T. Khat is a plant that's grown in
- 17 the Horn of Africa, generally, and if you pick the
- 18 leaves off the plant and chew them, it gives a stimulant
- 19 effect. And the reason it gives a stimulant effect is
- 20 because fresh leaves of khat contain a substance called
- 21 cathinone, which is a Schedule I substance illegal under
- 22 the CSA. It sort of produces amphetamine-like effects.
- 23 So khat is legal in many places in the
- 24 world. It's illegal to distribute it in this country
- 25 because, again, it contains -- when freshly picked,

- 1 contains a Schedule I controlled substance.
- 2 So there are a number of cases where the
- 3 government has prosecuted people under the CSA for
- 4 distributing cathinone in the form of distributing khat.
- 5 And defendants in those cases have said, Look, I didn't
- 6 know it had cathinone, I was distributing khat. It's
- 7 legal where I come from, I have no what the chemical is
- 8 in this -- in this plant. And the courts of appeals
- 9 have generally upheld those convictions based on
- 10 proof -- or when there is proof that the defendant knew
- 11 that distributing the khat was illegal, even if he
- 12 didn't know why it was illegal. Even if he didn't --
- 13 JUSTICE BREYER: Wait. The light is dawning
- 14 slightly, maybe. Don't say I'm restating your argument
- 15 correctly if I'm not.
- MS. HARRINGTON: Okay.
- 17 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. Please. The --
- 18 you're -- you're saying, first, he doesn't know the
- 19 chemistry. So he doesn't -- he has to know it's an
- 20 analogue, but he doesn't know the chemistry.
- Now, you're saying, of course, if he knows
- 22 that it is illegal under the Analogue Act, that's good
- 23 enough because he knows it's an analogue.
- MS. HARRINGTON: Yes.
- 25 JUSTICE BREYER: Now you're saying if he

- 1 knows it's illegal generally under the drug laws, that
- 2 should be evidence of the fact that he knows it's an
- 3 analogue because let's ask him why do you think it's
- 4 illegal under the analogue -- I mean, why do you think
- 5 it's illegal under the drug laws? I'm going to tell you
- 6 its not a listed substance. Why could it be? And he'd
- 7 sort of be stuck there because he doesn't want to say,
- 8 hmm, because it's a lot like cocaine.
- 9 MS. HARRINGTON: Right.
- 10 JUSTICE BREYER: Because once he says
- 11 because it's a lot like cocaine, he knows it's an
- 12 analogue. And if say, using my, you know, far out
- 13 examples, it's not because he thinks it's a veterinarian
- 14 law.
- So what it should be -- is this right -- if
- 16 I follow your argument, you'd say the fact that he knows
- 17 it's illegal under the drug laws, is, itself, evidence
- 18 that he knows it's an analogue, but he's free to come up
- 19 if he wants with some kind of basis for saying that even
- 20 though he thought it was illegal under the drug laws, he
- 21 thought it was illegal under some other law that had to
- 22 do with postage stamps or something. That -- that
- 23 should be, if the jury believes that, get him off.
- 24 Have I got it basically right?
- 25 MS. HARRINGTON: That's a correct

- 1 characterization of our narrower argument, yes, that
- 2 if -- right. If we can prove that the defendant
- 3 believed what he was doing violated some drug law,
- 4 that's enough to prove that he knowingly distributed an
- 5 analogue.
- 6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What would "some drug
- 7 law" be under the CSA and the Analogue Act?
- 8 MS. HARRINGTON: Right. In the Federal
- 9 context, there wouldn't be, but, again, our point is
- 10 really that the defendant, generally, does not have a
- 11 specific law in mind. He just knows that what he's
- 12 doing is breaking the law.
- And so when Petitioner says we have to prove
- 14 that he knew he was violating the -- the statute of
- 15 conviction, we think that's a -- much too high a burden.
- 16 The only time you have to do that is when you have a
- 17 willful standard in the tax evasion context; right?
- 18 This is certainly not that context. We
- 19 think just general knowledge of illegality and intention
- 20 to engage in the prohibited act is sufficient.
- 21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But -- but the illegality
- 22 must relate to drugs.
- MS. HARRINGTON: Pardon me?
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: The illegality must
- 25 relate to drugs.

- 1 MS. HARRINGTON: We think that's -- it's
- 2 certainly sufficient when the government proves that,
- 3 that the illegality relates to drugs.
- 4 JUSTICE KAGAN: And -- and sufficient. It's
- 5 not just evidence that he knew it was an analogue; it's
- 6 conclusive evidence.
- 7 MS. HARRINGTON: We think that's correct.
- 8 Yes. And, you know, to -- Petitioner suggests that the
- 9 courts --
- 10 JUSTICE KAGAN: So even if he comes back and
- 11 says, Yes, I thought that what I was doing was wrong,
- 12 but -- but it wasn't because I thought this was an
- 13 analogue, it was for some other reason.
- MS. HARRINGTON: Well, we think if he came
- 15 back, for example, and said, Well, I thought it violated
- 16 the Virginia Controlled Substances Act -- and because
- 17 not -- some States control more drugs than the
- 18 Federal -- than the Federal schedules include -- but I
- 19 didn't know it violated a Federal drug law, we think
- 20 that would not be a defense. Right? That some
- 21 knowledge that you're violating a drug law is
- 22 sufficient.
- 23 You know, and we think in this case there is
- 24 actually --
- 25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You said sufficient. How

- 1 about necessary? Is it necessary? Is the drug -- is
- 2 the law that he thinks he's violating, be a drug law, is
- 3 that necessary?
- 4 MS. HARRINGTON: So, again, we think that
- 5 there is -- that a broader view would be correct. But
- 6 we are perfectly happy with a ruling in this case that
- 7 it -- that it would be sufficient that the government --
- 8 we don't think that there is necessarily a basis for
- 9 limiting the knowledge of illegality specifically to
- 10 drug laws. As long as you tie the conducts to the
- 11 belief in illegality, we think that's enough.
- But we think it's definitely sufficient for
- 13 this case to hold that when the government proves a
- 14 belief that -- that he is violating a drug law, that
- 15 that's enough.
- 16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: So -- so the conduct is
- 17 related to the genus of illegality.
- 18 MS. HARRINGTON: Right.
- 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I think -- I think
- 20 there are areas where criminal defendants do try to
- 21 tailor their conduct to fall within, if they're captured
- 22 or caught, particular laws but not others. I recall
- 23 cases where that's true.
- I mean, hypothetically, let's say they know
- 25 that this much marijuana or cocaine is a misdemeanor.

- 1 If they got up to this much, you know, it's 15 years
- 2 mandatory minimum, so they structure their activities to
- 3 fall within the lower level.
- 4 You would be able to prosecute them,
- 5 according to your theory, for the big 15-year mandatory
- 6 whatever, if they happen to go beyond the misdemeanor
- 7 amount.
- 8 MS. HARRINGTON: Certainly, yes. You know,
- 9 if a defendant believed that he was distributing 1 pound
- 10 of cocaine and it turned out -- and that's probably,
- 11 it's, you know, I don't know what the right numbers are,
- 12 but say he believed he was distributing 1 pound of
- 13 cocaine. Turned out, he was distributing 5 pounds of
- 14 cocaine and there's different sentence that applies for
- 15 5 pounds. If we can prove he actually distributed 5
- 16 pounds of cocaine, then I think that would be sufficient
- 17 under the Controlled Substance Act.
- 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What does that do to
- 19 your theory that they have to -- what they have to know
- 20 is that it's illegal under the drug laws.
- 21 What -- what was illegal -- what they knew
- 22 was the misdemeanor amount. And you're saying, well,
- 23 that doesn't -- it doesn't matter that they -- doesn't
- 24 matter that they didn't know they were distributing the
- 25 larger amount.

- 1 MS. HARRINGTON: So I took your hypothetical
- 2 to be that he knew what he was doing was illegal. He
- 3 just --
- 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: He knew what he was
- 5 doing was an -- was a misdemeanor.
- 6 MS. HARRINGTON: Okay.
- 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Because of the
- 8 amount. He didn't know it was a going to be a felony
- 9 because he didn't know he had that much of the drug.
- 10 MS. HARRINGTON: Well, under our view, if he
- 11 knew what he was doing violated a drug law, which I
- 12 think would be the case in your hypothetical, then
- 13 that's sufficient.
- Now, of course, if he thought what he was
- 15 distribute -- what he was distributing was oregano and
- 16 it turned out to the marijuana, then we think that
- 17 wouldn't be sufficient because he would have believed
- 18 what he was doing was innocent, and he wouldn't have
- 19 known the facts that made his conduct illegal.
- 20 In this case, there are -- there are plenty
- 21 of facts to show that Petitioner really believed that
- 22 what he was doing was illegal, and it turned out that he
- 23 was correct. Again, he sold his products in little
- 24 baggies and vials instead of having sort of more
- 25 traditional commercial packaging. He charged \$450 an

- 1 ounce for these products, which sort of undercuts his
- 2 belief that he thought that they were aromatherapy
- 3 products or things that you would actually pour into a
- 4 bathtub. He named --
- 5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, you know, you charge
- 6 what the market will bear. And if it has the same
- 7 effect -- if it has the same effect as cocaine, even if
- 8 it's perfectly legal, you should charge 400. Don't you
- 9 believe in the free market?
- 10 (Laughter.)
- 11 MS. HARRINGTON: Not in the illegal drug --
- 12 I mean, you know, the free market works in the illegal
- 13 drug context the same way it works everywhere else.
- But I think it's certainly evidence that he
- 15 knew what he was selling was a drug, and it was an
- 16 illicit drug. And he named the analogues after --
- 17 JUSTICE SCALIA: All it shows is that he
- 18 knew it would give you a high. That's all. And -- and
- 19 so he was charging what people are willing to pay for
- 20 that.
- 21 MS. HARRINGTON: He also acted furtively.
- 22 You know, he sort of hid his products on his website.
- 23 He wouldn't answer direct questions from his customers
- 24 about which high, you know, was most like for the
- 25 controlled substances.

- 1 And so we think there is certainly
- 2 sufficient evidence to show that Petitioner in this case
- 3 believed that --
- 4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, the Petitioner's
- 5 counsel agrees that there is sufficient evidence to
- 6 convict under a proper instruction.
- 7 MS. HARRINGTON: Yes. I mean, I think he
- 8 has a different view of what a proper instruction is.
- 9 And so, again, I understand that the Court
- 10 generally remands for application of harmless error. We
- 11 think that would be appropriate in this case,
- 12 particularly, because the government didn't ask for this
- 13 instruction because it was following circuit precedent
- 14 below, and then defending a harsher instruction that was
- 15 actually given in the case.
- 16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: How can we -- when a jury
- 17 is told that human ingestion is enough, he has to -- he
- 18 has to intend that this -- these bath salts are not to
- 19 put in the bathtub, but to ingest, that's all that he --
- 20 that was the only mens rea that was charged. Isn't that
- 21 so?
- 22 MS. HARRINGTON: It was not the only mens
- 23 rea that was charged, Justice Ginsburg. That was the
- 24 mens rea instruction that the government requested
- 25 because that was what circuit precedent had said was

- 1 enough. But the instruction that was actually given,
- 2 told the jury it had to find that he knowingly
- 3 distributed a controlled substance -- a substance that
- 4 had the same pharmacological effects as a controlled
- 5 substance.
- 6 Thank you.
- 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- 8 Mr. Russell, you have four minutes left.
- 9 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN K. RUSSELL
- 10 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
- 11 MR. RUSSELL: Let me start with the
- 12 instruction.
- Justice Ginsburg, even under the
- 14 government's interpretation of the jury instructions as
- 15 requiring the jury to find that the defendant knew about
- 16 the similarity in effect, the government acknowledges it
- 17 didn't require any knowledge about the similarity
- 18 instruction. So the government has acknowledged that
- 19 this -- the instruction here was inadequate, even under
- 20 the government's new view of the law. And so the
- 21 question here is simply whether or not they're entitled
- 22 to take advantage of that, and to make a harmless error
- 23 argument, based on a theory that they only developed in
- 24 this Court.
- 25 But let me -- with respect to the general

- 1 legal questions, let me start with -- with addressing
- 2 their broad "any law will do" position. And that is
- 3 simply, as I understand them now, premised on their
- 4 thought that all the statute requires is culpable state
- 5 of mind, but that's not what the statute says. It
- 6 doesn't say distribute an analogue culpably, it says
- 7 distribute knowingly.
- 8 And this Court has repeatedly said that
- 9 knowing distribution of a prohibited item requires
- 10 knowledge of the facts. And there may be a -- an
- 11 exception that we've discussed that you can meet that by
- 12 showing that there's knowledge under the law of
- 13 conviction itself, but there is no precedent from this
- 14 Court that gives the court -- gives prosecutors the
- option of either proving the facts, the defendant knew
- 16 the facts that made the conduct unlawful, or simply that
- 17 he acted culpably or that he knew that the conduct was
- 18 unlawful under some law.
- 19 Now, with respect to their fallback
- 20 position, that it has to be illegal under a drug law,
- 21 we're getting closer. We would agree, if they were to
- 22 say, as some courts have said, including Hussein, which
- 23 is a case they feature prominently in their brief, that
- 24 it has to be a Federal anti-drug abuse law. Now, the
- 25 truth of the matter is there's only one of those, but

- 1 the -- the value in that articulation is that it makes
- 2 clear that the defendant doesn't have to know the name
- 3 of the statute.
- 4 But if the government's position is that
- 5 it's enough that it be under State drug abuse laws, and
- 6 Justice Alito, there are lots of State Analogue Acts,
- 7 and there are lots of States that have been ahead of the
- 8 government in putting on their schedules things that are
- 9 analogues, including some of the substances in this
- 10 case.
- 11 That's clearly not what this Court has ever
- 12 had in mind in interpreting the word "knowingly" in a
- 13 statute. And it's up to Congress to decide what is
- 14 culpable enough. And when it uses the word "knowingly,"
- 15 it is entitled to know that that word is going to get
- 16 the same interpretation that it has in the past. The
- 17 government points to cases like Bryan in which the Court
- 18 has said, in addition to knowing the facts, we must also
- 19 know something about the law. And it says that, you
- 20 know, willfulness is enough to establish knowing --
- 21 knowing distribution. But of course, in those cases,
- 22 it's not simply that they have some general knowledge of
- 23 unlawfulness, they also know the facts that make the
- 24 conduct unlawful.
- 25 JUSTICE ALITO: A defendant who knowingly

- 1 distributes heroin, knows that it's heroin, doesn't have
- 2 any idea that it's illegal, nevertheless has violated
- 3 the law. Now, I don't see why the rule should be any
- 4 different with respect to an analogue.
- 5 MR. RUSSELL: I -- I don't say that it is.
- 6 I think they have -- they can either --
- 7 JUSTICE ALITO: So then the defendant
- 8 doesn't have to know the legal status of -- of the drug.
- 9 MR. RUSSELL: Again, we're talking about the
- 10 government's alternative theory. The government always
- 11 has the option --
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Sorry. If a State law
- 13 calls it an analogue, he knows he's violating the State
- 14 law, he knows this is an analogue.
- 15 MR. RUSSELL: Well, if -- if he knew that he
- 16 was violating a State Analogue Act that had the same
- 17 definition under Federal law, I think you could then ask
- 18 the jury to infer that he knew that he was violating the
- 19 Federal law. But most of the time, as my colleague
- 20 said, the government's evidence is simply going to be
- 21 that the defendant knew that the conduct was unlawful
- 22 somehow. And the jury is entitled --
- 23 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I -- I'm not sure that you
- 24 answered Justice Alito's question fully.
- 25 MR. RUSSELL: I'm sorry.

- 1 JUSTICE KENNEDY: He -2 MR. RUSSELL: So --
- 3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Go ahead.
- 4 MR. RUSSELL: So, Justice Alito, the
- 5 government never has to prove the defendant's knowledge
- 6 about the law at all, if it proves that he knows the
- 7 facts that make the conduct unlawful. And so what we're
- 8 objecting to is the government's alternative route to
- 9 showing mens rea. And we agree with them up to the
- 10 point of the fact that they think that it's enough to
- 11 show that the defendant knew it was violating some State
- 12 law or perhaps some provision of the FDA which regulates
- 13 substances independent of the Controlled Substances Act.
- 14 As a practical matter, in most cases, what
- 15 the government -- the proof is going to be what the
- 16 government described, which is simply that the defendant
- 17 engaged in some furtive conduct that suggests that he
- 18 knows that the substance is illegal.
- 19 And unless the -- the defendant comes
- 20 forward with some reason for the jury to think that, in
- 21 fact, he had in mind that it violated some other law, or
- 22 in fact, that he looked and -- and came to the
- 23 conclusion it doesn't violate this Controlled Substances
- 24 Act, then the jury is very likely to find mens rea
- 25 established, and we don't have any problem with that.

1	In this just to finally address the facts
2	of this case. The fact that my client was distributing
3	things in baggies rather than vials shows that he was
4	doing this from his home business. The fact that he was
5	charging large prices shows that he thought he had found
6	a loophole in the Federal drug laws. There is no reason
7	in the world why he would have if I could finish this
8	sentence why he would have flushed his product down
9	the toilet when he discovered that it contained a
10	substance that was on the schedules if, in fact, he knew
11	that the other products also were illegal and didn't
12	care.
13	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
14	The case is submitted.
15	(Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the case in the
16	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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